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Chapter 2
Developments in State and
Local Pension Plans
Olivia S. Mitchell, David McCarthy,
Stanley C. Wisniewski, and Paul Zorn
In this chapter we explore aspects of the history, financing, benefit struc-
ture, and governance of pension plans covering state and local government
employees in the United States. State and local pension plans cover a wide
range of employees including uniformed workers (firefighters and police),
teachers, members of the judiciary, and other members of state govern-
ments and local municipalities. These plans are the subject of much interest
because they are so large-they cover close to 13 million employees, pay
benefits to more than 5 million beneficiaries, and control $2.4 trillion in in-
vested plan assets.1 And as we show in this chapter, these plans are extremely
diverse in terms of design, investment policy, and governance, in large part
because of their different histories and constituencies. Yet despite the differ-
ences across plans, they all face some similar challenges and opportunities
in the years to come.
In order to understand how these state and local plans work, it is useful
to recall that public sector pension plans in the United States tend to be
of the defined benefit (DB) variety. This means that retiring vested employ-
ees receive a specified retirement benefit throughout the course of their re-
tirement that depends on age, years of service, and salary.2 In the case of
DB plans, required contributions are typically based on actuarial valuations,
and investments are managed by financial experts selected by the pension
board. By contrast, in the private sector, many people are covered by de-
fined contribution (DC) plans where the amounts contributed to the plan
are specified, but not the benefit payouts.3 In the DC case, plan participants
generally decide where to direct their investments, given a set of options
established by the employer. Retirement benefits are then paid from the
contributions and investment income that accumulate in the participants'
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accounts. If the funds in the accounts are not sufficient to pay benefits over
the course of retirement, retirees must turn to other sources.4
Despite the large size and impact of public pensions, there remains much
to learn about how these institutions function. Although the federal Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) requires private
pensions to furnish periodic and standardized reports to plan participants
and the U. S. Department of Labor (McGill et al. 1997), state and local retire-
ment plans are exempt from ERISA's reporting requirements. However, to
comply with generally accepted accounting principles, state and local gov-
ernments are bound to financial measurement and reporting requirements
established by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB). For
state and local retirement plans (and their sponsoring governments) the
GASB's standards establish a uniform format for reporting financial infor-
mation.
In order to explore key aspects of these pension systems for the present
study, this chapter relies on several different sources including Bureau
of Labor Statistics surveys on state and local pension plans (BLS, various
years), Census of Government reports, and the PENDATsurveys conducted
by the Public Pension Coordinating Council (hereafter PPCC; see Zorn
1997). These data, taken together, afford a useful set of insights into this
important pension domain.
In the discussion that follows, we first offer a brief history of retirement
systems in the public sector. We then proceed to describe and assess four
aspects of public pension plan structure: their benefit provisions, their gov-
ernance structure, how they are financed, and their investment behavior
and performance. In doing so we seek to offer a better understanding of
the way public pension plans work, and also to illuminate some of the chal-
lenges and opportunities facing public pension plans over the next several
decades.
An Overview of State and Local Retirement Systems 5
The first municipal retirement system in the United States was established
in 1857, to provide lump sum benefits for New York City policemen injured
in the line ofduty. In 1878, this plan was revised to provide retirement bene-
fits of one-half of final pay, for policemen completing twenty-one years of
service. Over the next fifty years, numerous other state and local jurisdic-
tions established retirement plans throughout the United States. But it was
not until after the Social Security Act was passed in 1935 that public pension
plan growth began in earnest.
The 1930-50 period. Between 1931 and 1950, half of the largest state and
local plans in the country were established (U.S. Congress 1978). Initially,
many of these plans provided two-part retirement benefits: one paid by the
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employer, based on the employee's salary and years ofservice at retirement,
and a second resulting from annuitizing the employee's accumulated con-
tributions. Often the employee's contributions were determined so that the
total cost of the retirement benefit was allocated evenly between the em-
ployee and the employer.
In some instances, the employer's portion of the benefit simply matched
the annuity provided by the employee's accumulated contributions. How-
ever, in order for employees of different ages and genders to receive ade-
quate benefits on retirement, different employee contribution rates were
required, and the plans became quite complex to administer. Consequently,
many plans later changed their designs to provide for a pension based solely
on age and years of service at retirement. Although employee contribu-
tions were still required, the amount of the retirement benefit no longer
depended on the employee's accumulated contributions (Bleakney 1972).
When social security was first enacted in 1935, this federal old-age pro-
gram intentionally excluded state and local government employees from
coverage. This was mainly due to constitutional issues concerning the fed-
eral government's right to tax state and local governments. In 1950, how-
ever, Congress amended the Social Security Act to allow states to voluntarily
provide social security coverage for their employees, when a state entered
into an agreement with the Social Security Administration. In 1986, Con-
gress mandated Medicare coverage for state and local employees hired after
March 31, 1986 (IRS 1997). More recently, Congress has discussed man-
dating social security coverage for all newly hired state and local workers;
whether this will actually mitigate social security's long-run financial prob-
lems is subject to debate (SSAC 1996).
The 1950-80 period. Congress's decision to provide states with the option
to become included in social security resulted in many changes to state and
local plan design during the 1950s; in fact, during this period more than
one-third of the nation's largest public sector pensions were changed (U.S.
Congress 1978). Initially, many of the plans joining social security devel-
oped a split-benefit formula, with a lower unit benefit percentage applied
to the first $4,200 of final average salary and a higher percentage applied to
the amount over $4,200. (The figure of$4,200 represented the social secu-
rity covered earnings ceiling at the time.) Nevertheless, many of these same
plans returned to a single benefit percentage in the 1980s, after it became
clear that the split-benefit formula was difficult to administer and resulted
in lower proportional benefits to lower-paid workers.
The 1960s and 1970s saw substantial consolidation among public pen-
sions in the U.S. This occurred as pensions sought to take advantage of scale
economies and upgrade their technologies. During this period, many of the
larger pension systems succeeded in bringing smaller plans under their cov-
erage. Consolidation proved not to be a panacea, however, and it continued
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TABLE 1. Changes in State and Local Pension Systems, 1986-97
1986-87 1996-97
State Local Total State Local Total
Number ofsystems I 201 2,213 2,414 212 2,052 2,264
Number of members I
Active members (M) 9.2 1.5 10.7 11.2 1.6 12.8
Inactive members (M) 1.0 0.1 1.1 2.3 0.1 2.4
Retirees and beneficiaries (M) 3.0 0.7 3.7 4.3 1.0 5.3
Total members (M) 13.2 2.3 15.5 17.8 2.7 20.5
Ratio of active to retired members 3.1 2.1 2.9 2.6 1.6 2.4
Receipts I
Employee contributions ($B) 9.4 1.8 11.2 17.4 3.4 20.8
Government contributions ($B) 23.3 7.1 30.4 37.1 7.8 44.9
Earnings on investment ($B) 45.0 12.7 57.7 133.9 25.1 159.0
Total receipts ($B) 77.7 21.6 99.3 188.4 36.3 224.7
% from employee contributions 12.1 8.3 11.3 9.2 9.4 9.3
% from government contributions 30.0 32.9 30.6 19.7 21.5 20.0
% from investment earnings 57.9 58.8 58.1 71.1 69.1 70.8
Total investments ($B)2 530.1 2,094.1
Sources:
IU.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments (specified years).
2Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1999).
Values for total investments are not comparable with the values for contributions and earn-
ings on investment due to differences in the methods used to collect the data by the different
sources.
to be complex to manage benefits for multiple and divergent employee
groups that often had very distinct plan provisions and separate valuations
(U.S. Congress 1978).
The period from 1980 to the present. The 1980s saw many state legislatures
seeking to expand the investment options available to state and local re-
tirement plans. One way this occurred was with the substitution of a gen-
eral standard of prudence for more restrictive "legal lists." Prior to 1980,
public plan investments were typically limited to certain types of securities,
approved by the state legislature, from which public pension plans were al-
lowed to choose. The movement to the prudence standard permitted the
public funds to hold a larger percentage of assets in equities (usually in do-
mestic stocks), and it positioned many systems to take advantage of the un-
precedented stock market returns experienced over the next decade. The
income from these investments, coupled with actuarially sound employer
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and employee contributions, has resulted in strong funding levels for many
state and local systems today.
To illustrate some ofthe dramatic changes experienced by state and local
pension plans over the recent past, data on system membership, receipts,
and total investments are provided in Table 1 for 1987 and 1997. One impor-
tant change evidenced over this period pertains to the substantial increases
in both system receipts and total investments. Across all state and local sys-
tems combined, total receipts more than doubled from $99B in 1987 to
$225B in 1997. Most of this increase was attributable to investment earnings,
which almost tripled from $58B to $159B over the period. These earnings,
combined with employer and employee contributions, quadrupled total sys-
tem assets and resulted in an aggregate public pension pool of over $2 tril-
lion in 1997. In defined benefit plans, which are the majority of state and
local pensions, investment earnings in excess of the actuarial funding as-
sumptions generally reduce employer contributions (Hustead this volume).6
Other changes in state and local retirement systems in the last decade are
also illustrated in Table 1. Although the overall number of systems declined
slightly from 2,414 to 2,264, the total number ofactive members grew almost
20 percent, from 10.7M to 12.8M people. The retiree/beneficiary popula-
tion grew even faster (some 43 percent), from 3.7M to 5.3M. Consequently,
the ratio of active members to retirees fell from 2.9 to 2.4 for the combined
systems (and from 2.1 to 1.6 in local systems alone). In the absence of sub-
stantial investment reserves, this decline would likely have put upward pres-
sure on employer contributions, since retiree benefits were rising relative to
active member payrolls.
'lYpes of State and Local Retirement Systems
Public sector retirement systems can be categorized according to many di-
mensions including the type of benefit provided, the type of employees
covered, the type of administrative jurisdiction, the number of contribut-
ing employers, the size of the plan, and the like. Here we have chosen to
focus mainly on the differences and similarities among systems categorized
by type of covered employees and administrative jurisdiction.
One reason why pension plans differ is that they cover employees with dif-
ferent employment characteristics. For instance, because police work and
fire fighting are physically demanding occupations, retirement benefits for
public safety workers typically allow retirement at earlier ages, in part to
maintain a younger workforce. Consequently, the retirement benefits avail-
able to police and firefighters are usually different from those provided to
teachers or to general employees. Social security coverage also affects bene-
fit offerings. Plans whose workers are not covered by social security often
provide higher retirement benefits to mitigate the lack of social security in-
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come in retirement. Since fewer teachers and public safety workers are in-
cluded in social security than other workers, this also affects the benefits
they are provided.?
Retirement systems also differ by administrative jurisdiction, with large
state-level plans often having different characteristics than plans offered by
small localities. This is often the result of the different political environments
in which the systems operate, as well as the number of members covered
by the system. System size may affect the resources available to the system
for operations. Larger systems tend to have larger staffs. Larger systems also
tend to have a larger amount of assets to invest and greater potential for
portfolio diversification, which in turn may afford them greater flexibility in
selecting investments and greater leverage in negotiations with investment
managers.
Membership and Coverage in State and Local Pensions
To better understand what groups of workers are covered by public plans,
Table 2 indicates system membership by plan type.s These data are based on
the PPCC's 1997 survey of state and local retirement plans covering 11 mil-
lion active members, and 4 million retirees and beneficiaries. Most active
members (6 million or 57 percent) were covered by state-administered re-
tirement systems, approximately one-third (3 million or 29 percent) were
in systems specifically for teachers or school employees, one-tenth (1 mil-
lion) were in locally administered systems primarily serving general employ-
ees, and the remaining active members (327 thousand, or about 3 percent)
were in systems specifically for public safety employees (i.e., police and fire-
fighters). Similar breakdowns apply for the retiree/beneficiary breakdowns.
Of the 4 million retirees and beneficiaries covered by plans surveyed, 2 mil-
lion (56 percent) were in state-administered systems, 1 million (27 percent)
were in systems for teachers and school employees, 466 thousand (11 per-
cent) were in general local systems, and the remaining 168 thousand (4 per-
cent) were in public safety systems. The ratio of active to retired members
in Table 2 is lower, on average, for systems that cover only local employees
(2.4 active/retired), than for statewide systems (2.7 active/retired). Further-
more, the active/retired ratio for teacher and school employees is somewhat
higher than the average (3.0), and for public safety employees it is lower
than average (1.9).
Eligibility and Benefit Provisions in Public Pension Plans
The primary goal of a retirement system is to provide retirement benefits
in a cost-effective manner, which, when combined with social security (if
available) and personal savings, result in benefits that sustain the retiree's
Developments in State and Local Plans , 7
TABLE 2. State and Local Government Membership by Plan Type, 1996
Teruher
State and school Police and Local
employee employee firefighter employee All
systems systems systems systems systems
Number of systems 68 31 35 127 261
Number of plans 72 40 126 140 378
Number of participants
Active members (M) 6.320 3.276 0.327 1.105 11.028
Retirees and
beneficiaries (M) 2.349 1.109 0.168 0.466 4.092
Total (M) 8.669 4.385 0.495 1.571 15.120
Average active members per
plan (000) 87.8 81.9 2.6 7.9 57.9
Ratio of active to retired
members 2.7 3.0 1.9 2.4 2.7
Source: Authors' tabulations from PPCC, PENDAT Database, 1997.
Means weighted by number of members.
standard of living through retirement. As noted earlier, almost all state and
local retirement plans are of the defined benefit variety (BLS 1994). Con-
sequently, the differences in benefits paid by state and local government
systems are mainly a function of the specific details of the defined benefit
plans.
Eligibility. Several key design features of public pension plans are indi-
cated in Table 3, along with comparable evidence, where available, for pri-
vate sector pensions. Most public sector employees tend to be included in
their pension plan at hire, whereas private sector employees must gener-
ally meet an age and/or service requirement in order to be covered by their
plans. Becoming legally entitled to a benefit typically occurs at a discrete
time after a specific period ofservice, with cliffvesting the norm in both pub-
lic and private retirement systems. But public sector workers take longer on
average to vest, with 43 percent having to work ten years before becoming
legally entitled to a benefit. By contrast their private sector counterparts
typically vest after five years (or at seven years if the employer uses a graded
vesting rule).
There are, of course, important differences in eligibility rules for pensions
covering teachers, police and firefighters, and general employees. Members
of teacher retirement systems often vest in their benefits after five or ten
years of service, although in a few instances the vesting period is as low as
three years, and in two cases the consolidated state systems offer immediate
vesting. Vesting requirements for police and firefighters vary widely, from
a low of three years to a high of twenty. Among general plans covering all
TABLE 3. Comparing Public and Private Defined Benefit Pension Plan
Design Features
1. Participation: minimum age or service or both (%)
2. Cliffvesting (%)
At any age
<5 years
5 years
6-9 years
10 years
>10 years
Other
3. Early retirement permitted (%)
Eligibility based on
Service (S) alone
Age (A) alone
A55+S10
A+S other
4. Normal retirement (%)
Service alone
S30
Age alone:
A62
Age+Service:
A55+S30
A62+S10
5. Benefit formulas (%)
Dollar amount basis
Earnings basis
Career
Terminal
Five years used
Three years used
Other
Other basis
Percent of pay per year of service
<1.25
1.25-1.74
1.75-2.00
2.00+
Other
6. Prevalence ofpostretirement increases (%)
Automatic
Public (1994)
100
5
47
5
43
87
23
o
8
61
43
29
5
40
11
5
99
20
61
18
78
6
24
6
43
o
45
Private (1995)
69
96
87
6
3
96
7
5
31
53
6
5
40
3
3
9
23
69
11
58
78
17
15
2
37
12
18
3
4
3
Sources: Adapted from Mitchell and McCarthy (1999); uses BLS (1995) for 1994 public plan
data and BLS (1996) for 1995 private plan data.
I Not reported in BLS (1995).
2Less than 0.5%.
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state and local workers, vesting periods are five or ten years, although a few
systems use intermediate periods (seven or eight years; Zorn 1999).
Many plans also permit "purchase ofservice" credit, a concept that refers
to the opportunity for public employees to purchase credit for past service
under the plan. Without these arrangements, an individual who frequently
changesjobs might work under several retirement plans over the course of
his or her career without becoming vested. These provisions differ widely
from one state to another, however, with regard to the types and prices of
service that can be purchased, maximum amounts, and the payment options
available.
Retirement benefits. Turning to DB benefit formulas, Table 3 shows that
final average earnings playa central role in the pension formulas of state
and local pension plans. By contrast, almost a quarter of the private pen-
sion plans use a flat dollar formula, mainly found in manufacturing union-
negotiated plans. Public sector pension benefit formulas often use the last
three years of an employee's pay to determine the benefit amount (61 per-
cent), while private plans more commonly use five years or an even longer
period (such as career average) to determine the fraction of pay used in the
benefit formula (78 percent).
Another aspect of public pension plans is that a higher benefit multiplier
tends to be applied per year of service than in private plans. Table 3 shows
that 43 percent of public plans use a benefit multiplier giving more than
2 percent of pay per year of service, while only 4 percent of private sector
plans accumulate benefits at this rate. Other studies have also pointed to
the relatively larger benefits paid by public plans. Comparisons based on
income replacement rates furnished by the BLS indicate that, at the turn
of the decade, lower-tenured public sector retirees received benefits about
50 percent greater than their private sector counterparts (BLS 1989,1992).
The same studies reported that higher-seniority workers in the public sec-
tor received a replacement rate half to two-thirds greater at the same pay
and service levels than in the private sector. It is not known whether these
relative benefit levels changed more recently, since BLS no longer provides
these comparative tabulations.
However, these comparisons do not take into account the fact that state
and local employees contribute approximately one-third of the total contri-
butions made to their defined benefit plans, while private sector employees
typically make no direct contributions to their DB plans. Given that pub-
lie sector employees typically pay a significant portion of the cost of the
DB benefits they receive, it is not unreasonable that their benefits would
be higher than in the private sector, all else held equa1.9 Furthermore, the
studies referenced above do not include benefits received from defined con-
tribution plans. Since many private sector employers supplement DB bene-
fits with benefits provided through defined contribution plans, a significant
20 Mitchell. McCarthy. Wisniewski. Zorn
TABLE 4. State and Local Government Benefits Design Features by Plan Type,
1996
Teacher
State and scJwol Police and Local
employee employee firefighter employee All
systems systems systems systems systems
Average annual unit benefit (% ofpay/year)
Covered by social security 1.67 1.89 2.26 1.72 1.74
Not covered by social security 1.90 2.02 2.30 2.24 1.99
Average accrued 30-year benefit (% offinal pay)
Covered by social security 51.2 57.7 66.6 57.3 53.5
Not covered by social security 57.1 61.9 70.1 69.1 60.3
Form of benefit (% ofplans providing)
Straight-life annuity 87 95 67 78 78
Joint and survivor annuity 84 95 81 87 86
Joint and 50% survivor 79 95 64 80 76
Joint and 100% survivor 69 85 64 69 69
Joint and survivor "pop-up" 57 76 30 26 38
Source: Authors' tabulations from PPCC, PENDAT Database, 1997. See Zorn (1997).
Means weighted by number of members.
portion of the private sector retirement benefit is not included in the com-
parison made from the BLS data (Zorn 1995).
Another explanation for the difference in benefit accrual levels between
public and private pension plans is that approximately one-quarter of pub-
lic employees are not covered by social security (U S. House Ways and Means
1998).10 As noted above, retirement plans whose employees are not covered
by social security often provide higher retirement benefits to partially offset
the lack of social security benefits. This pattern varies by employee groups,
as indicated in Table 4.
Lack of social security coverage for some public sector workers may also
explain why postretirement increases are more prevalent in the public than
in the private sector; fully 45 percent of these plans offered a form of auto-
matic indexation (although it appears that few had full inflation indexation).
Automatic indexation is rare in the private sector, although augmentation
of pensions at the discretion of the trustees is often seen.
Disability benefits. Among public plans, 91 percent had disability retirement
provisions in 1994, as compared with only 73 percent of private plans in
1995. Almost half (42 percent) of public plans allowed workers to retire with
unreduced normal benefits compared with fewer (29 percent) of private
plans. Qualifying age and service conditions for disability retirement also
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tend to be less restrictive in the public sector (BLS 1994,1995). This may be
because disability is often covered through long-term disability (LTD) plans
in the private sector, rather than through the pension plan, which is more
common in the public sector.
Retirement Benefits Provided to Employee Groups
There is substantial variation in the retirement benefits provided by plans
to different employee groups. This variation is a result of a combination of
factors, including the different types ofwork performed and changes in the
overall environment in which the plans developed. As a result of this varia-
tion, it is difficult to define a "typical" retirement benefit. Nevertheless, it is
instructive to compare the general features of these plans.
Teacher plans. Among teachers' plans, the retirement benefit formula is
usually a single-rate unit benefit, that is, the same benefit multiplier is ap-
plied to all years of service under the plan. As shown in Table 4, the unit
benefit multiplier averaged 1.89 percent for employees covered by social
security and 2.02 percent for employees not covered by social security. The
accrued benefit after thirty years of service averaged 57.7 percent of final
average salary for employees covered by social security, and 61.9 percent for
those not covered. Final average salary is usually based on the highest three
or five years of service, with the highest three years being predominant.
Many of the teacher systems offer an early retirement option under which
employees can retire before reaching the age and service requirements for
unreduced benefits (Wisniewski 1999). Generally, this option is available
after twenty years ofservice; many teacher systems allow retirement at age 55
after completion of twenty-five years of service. In almost all cases, the bene-
fit is reduced to reflect the full actuarial cost of early retirement, although
two-thirds allow unreduced benefits to be paid at age 60, once the em-
ployee has vested in the benefit. A large fraction of the teacher systems also
offers automatic postretirement cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) to pro-
tect retirement earnings from inflation, although COLA formulas vary. For
example, the Wisconsin Retirement System provides supplemental cost-of-
living increases when investment earnings exceed the actuarially assumed
rate (Wisniewski 1999). In other cases, employees lacking social security cov-
erage are more likely to have automatic cost-of-living adjustments.
Public safety plans. For police and firefighters, retirement benefit formulas
also vary, often linked to the plan's vesting requirements. Typically systems
that require twenty years of service for vesting purposes have benefit formu-
las that specify a flat percent of final average salary to be paid at retirement
(often 50 percent). Systems that allow vesting after five or ten years have
unit benefit formulas that use either a single-rate or variable-rate multipli-
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ers for each year of service. Under a variable-rate formula, different benefit
accumulation rates apply to different years of service. For example, under a
variable rate formula, a member may accumulate a retirement benefit of2.0
percent for the first ten years of service, and 1.75 percent thereafter (or vice
versa). Variable-rate formulas are often used in situations where members
are not covered under social security.
The unit benefit multiplier for police and firefighters covered by social
security averages 2.26 percent, and 2.30 percent for those not covered. Ac-
crued benefits after thirty years ofservice average 66.6 percent of final aver-
age salary for those covered by social security, and 70.1 percent for those
not covered. Final average salary is often based on the highest three years
of service; however, in some cases it is tied to the employee's final salary or
the salary attached to a certain rank. Few of the systems offer an early retire-
ment option, but unreduced retirement benefits are frequently available at
age 50 or 55, after twenty years of service; in addition, unreduced benefits
may be available at any age after twenty-five years of service. Most police and
firefighter plans (80 percent) offer postretirement cost-of-living adjustments
(Zorn 1999).
General employee plans. Turning to general public employee plans, age and
service requirements for retirement are similar to those for teachers, with
many systems offering unreduced retirement benefits at age 55, with twenty-
five or thirty years of service, and retirement at age 60 or 62 upon vesting.
As with teacher systems, single-rate benefit formulas are often used. Benefit
formulas use a unit benefit multiplier averaging 1.72 percent for employees
covered by social security and 2.24 percent for those not covered. The ac-
crued benefit after thirty years of service averaged 57.3 percent of final aver-
age salary for those covered by social security, and 69.1 percent for those
not covered. Final average salary is typically based on the highest three or
five years of service (Zorn 1999). Many systems covering general local em-
ployees offer an early retirement option available at ages 50 or 55 with ten
to twenty years of service. In almost all cases, the benefit is reduced for early
retirement but, in some instances, does not reflect the full actuarial cost.
Approximately 80 percent of the systems offer postretirement cost-of-living
adjustments (Zorn 1999).
Changes over time. By comparing these pension characteristics with those
reported in earlier studies, some changes can be discerned in the way pen-
sion plans have designed their benefit structures over time. First, there ap-
pears to be a significant movement away from integration of benefits with
social security, a trend perceived among both public and private pensions.
The proportion of public plans with a benefit formula integrated with social
security decreased from 10 percent to 4 percent between 1992 and 1994; for
private plans this proportion decreased from 63 percent to 51 percent be-
tween 1989 and 1995 (BLS 1989,1995). While no single explanation for this
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trend is available, it may be that increased uncertainty about the social secu-
rity system has led employers to curtail the risk that might be associated with
unanticipated changes in the old-age benefits provided by the government.
Second, the prevalence of the "age 55/service 10" (A55/S10)combination
for early retirement appears to have decreased over time, in favor of com-
binations with less service (in 1989, fully 43 percent of private plans used
A55/SIO and 9 percent A55/S5, compared with 31 percent and 21 percent,
respectively, in private plans for 1995; BLS 1989, 1995). Third, pensions in
the public sector uniformly base benefits on earnings rather than on a flat
dollar amount, whereas almost a fifth of the corporate plans use flat dollar
formulas.
Paying for Public Pensions
The promise of paying a pension benefit establishes an obligation on the
part of the employer, which is usually financed by employer and/or em-
ployee contributions as well as income earned on invested assets. Determin-
ing how much to contribute, and how to invest the assets, are key responsi-
bilities of the pension plan's board and staff. To assist in carrying out these
responsibilities, retirement plans often hire actuaries, investment consul-
tants, and other specialized professionals.
Actuarial valuations and assumptions. In order to measure plan obligations
and determine the contributions necessary to systematically prefund bene-
fits over time, pension plans hire actuaries to conduct valuations of the plan.
The actuaries combine information about past and anticipated age, service,
and compensation of the plan's membership with demographic assumptions
related to mortality, disability, and probabilities ofretirement, and with eco-
nomic assumptions regarding wage increases and long-term rates of return
on plan investments (Hustead this volume). The resulting valuation gives
employers a measure of the plan's long-term liabilities and the contribu-
tions required to fund those liabilities in a systematic manner over time.
Actuarial assumptions regarding inflation, wage increases, and investment
returns are key elements in the valuation of plan liabilities. For example, as-
sumed rates of return that are higher than can be sustained over time will,
all else held equal, result in higher long-term plan costs, since the calculated
employer contributions (and related investment earnings) will be less than
would otherwise be the case.
For plans surveyed by the PPCC (Zorn 1999), the average assumed rate
of return was 7.8 percent, with marginally higher rates assumed by systems
serving state employees and teachers (8.0 percent for both groups) and the
same or slightly lower rates for systems serving public safety and general
local employees (7.8 and 7.7 percent respectively; see Table 5). Assump-
tions related to wage increases (including inflation and step/merit increases)
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TABLE 5. State and Local Government Retirement System Funding, 1996
Teacher
State and school Police and Local
employee employee firefighter employee All
systems systems systems systems systems
Assumptions
Actuarial assumed rate of
return 8.0 8.0 7.8 7.7 7.8
Actuarial assumed wage
increase 5.9 6.4 5.9 5.7 5.9
Actuarial assumed rate of
inflation 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.4
Valuations
Actuarial accrued liability ($B) 605.8 436.6 85.6 117.6 1,245.6
Actuarial value of assets ($B) 545.8 358.0 74.9 113.5 1,092.2
Ratio of assets to liabilities (%) 90.1 82.0 87.5 96.5 88.2
Other magnitudes
Amortization of unfunded
liability (years) 25.4 26.1 22.1 20.9 22.9
Employer contributions as
percentage of payrOll * 9.16 9.30 16.02 9.54 9.52
Member contributions as
percentage of payroll * 4.39 6.08 7.02 5.32 5.09
Total additions ($B) 109.4 68.7 3.2 14.1 195.4
Member contributions 8.7 6.2 0.2 1.4 16.5
Employer contributions 17.4 8.7 0.6 2.7 29.4
Investment income 83.3 53.8 2.4 10.0 149.5
Notes
Member contributions (%) 8 9 6 10 8
Employer contributions (%) 16 13 19 19 15
Investment income (%) 76 78 75 71 77
Source: Authors' tabulations from PPCC, PENDAT Database, 1997. See Zorn (1997).
Means weighted by payroll.
varied more across groups. The average assumption for all respondents was
5.9 percent, compared with 6.4 percent for systems covering teachers and
5.7 percent for those covering general employees. However, the assump-
tions regarding inflation were very similar across the covered groups, aver-
aging 4.4 percent overall and only marginally higher assumptions among
systems serving state employees and teachers.
Assets, liabilities, and plan funding. Actuaries calculate the plan's accrued
liability in order to measure the long-term cost of retirement benefits and
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develop a systematic approach for funding the benefits over time. Differ-
ent actuarial methods can be used to calculate the liability, depending on
the funding pattern appropriate to the needs of the plan. Approximately
two thirds of state and local plans surveyed by the PPCC use the entry age
actuarial cost method, which calculates employer contributions as a level
percent of payroll over time (McGill et al. 1997). This approach tends to
stabilize pension contributions for long-term budgeting purposes.
Actuaries also determine the value of public pension assets accumulated
to pay retiree benefits. The difference between the actuarial value of assets
and the actuarial accrued liability is referred to as the "unfunded actuarial
accrued liability," and it is amortized through contributions over time - typi-
cally twenty to thirty years. The actuarial value of assets is often determined
in a manner that smoothes year-to-year market fluctuations over a three or
five-year averaging period. This dampens the impact of short-term invest-
ment volatility on the measure of plan assets and tends to stabilize contri-
butions.
Since actuarial methods and assumptions vary among the plans, so will
the resulting asset/liability measures. This means that funding comparisons
across plans are not strictly comparable (since all plans do not apply the
same actuarial method and set of assumptions), but each plan's reported as-
set/liability measures reflect the methods and assumptions actually used to
fund that plan. ll With this caveat in mind, Table 5 shows that the actuarial
accrued liability totaled close to $1.3 trillion across the entire set of plans
responding to the PPCC survey in 1997, with approximately $1.1 trillion in
assets available to fund the liability (Zorn 1999). Overall, the financial as-
sets as well as liabilities of the systems serving state employees and teachers
were substantially larger than those serving public safety and general local
employees, since the state and teacher systems cover substantially more em-
ployees.
One measure that is often used to examine progress made in funding a
retirement system is the "funding ratio," calculated by dividing the actuarial
value of assets by actuarial accrued liabilities. Although this may be an im-
perfect measure of year-to-year progress made toward system funding, due
to changes over time in the underlying assumptions and methods ofmeasur-
ing plan assets and/or plan liabilities, it is often used as a summary measure
of funded status. Table 5 shows that the overall public plan funding ratio
in 1996 was estimated at 88 percent for survey respondents; state and gen-
erallocal employee plans had somewhat higher funding ratios (90.1 percent
and 96.5 percent, respectively) than did systems covering teachers and pub-
lic safety employees (82.0 percent and 87.5 percent, respectively). Table 5
also indicates that the average period for amortizing the unfunded actuarial
accrued liability was approximately twenty-three years.
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TABLE 6. Changes in Average and Median Financial Status of State and Local
Pension Plans, 1992-96
1992 1996
#Matched
Average Median Average Median cases
Assets and liabilities ($000)
Pension plan assets 1 3,043,038 381,348 4,318,185 562,873 222
Pension plan liabilities 2 3,657,065 472,916 4,954,381 679,507 222
Total underfunding 614,027 36,862 636,196 39,533 222
Stock funding ratio (%)
Assets/liabilities ($-wtd) 83 87 87 91 222
Contributions ($000)
Req. employer
contributions 99,420 13,115 105,168 14,580 211
Actual contributions 138,959 18,531 162,846 20,930 211
Employer 88,866 12,454 102,662 14,580 211
Employee 50,093 4,553 60,184 5,316 211
Flow funding ratio (%)
Required/actual
contributions 95 100 98 100 211
Benefit payments ($000)
Total benefit payments 161,547 12,485 204,289 18,048 135
Retirement 141,363 10,540 177,823 12,623 135
Disability 11,884 954 16,047 1,333 135
Survivors 6,361 823 8,086 971 135
Lump sum 1,940 0 2,333 0 135
Per active participant ($000) $-wtd. Median
Actuarial value of assets 165 116
Actuarial accrued liability 211 148
Contributions 5.5 3.4
Source: Authors' tabulations from PPCC, PENDAT Database (1995 and 1997). See Zorn (1997).
1Measured as the actuarial value of plan assets.
2 Measured as the actuarial accrued liability.
More detail on public pension plans' financial status appears in Table 6.
Here we provide average and median information for the public pension
plans responding to the PPCC surveys in both 1992 and 1996; these are the
for "matched cases" in the two years, a comparison that facilitates an assess-
ment of the direction ofchange.J2 The data show that median funding ratios
went from 87 percent to 91 percent between 1992 and 1996, and a similar
pattern applies to the mean. In 1996, the average public pension plan re-
ported actuarially-based assets of $4.32 billion and an average reported lia-
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bility of $4.95 billion, for an average actuarial unfunded liability of about
$630 million per plan. On an active participant basis, the median dollar-
weighted value of assets per participant in 1996 was $116,000 with $148,000
in accrued liabilities.
In addition to the stock funding measures, we also report a "flow" funding
measure in Table 6. This gauges the extent to which employer contributions
in a given year cover the amounts necessary to systematically fund the plan.
It is interesting that the average flow funding rate in 1996 stood at 98 per-
cent and the median at 100 percent, indicating that public employers typi-
cally met their new pension obligations as they arose. The 1996 figures are
not strictly comparable with those from 1992, since the GASB changed the
way in which required contributions were reported during this time. Also
the actuarial value of assets is often determined in a manner that smoothes
year-to-year fluctuations, so increases in market value over time might not
be fully reflected in the 1996 reported actuarial value of assets controlled
by these public pension plans. These changes probably account for some of
the observed discrepancy between stock and flow finding patterns between
1992 and 1996.
Employer and employee contributions. Employer contributions to public sec-
tor DB pension plans are based on actuarial valuations: generally a portion
of the contribution covers the "normal cost" of funding benefits accrued to
members in the current year, and another portion amortizes the unfunded
liability. In the PENDAT plans surveyed, this unfunded liability is usually
amortized over periods from twenty to thirty years. As shown in Table 5, em-
ployer contributions, including both the normal cost and amortization of
the unfunded accrued liability, average 9.5 percent of payrOll for the PEN-
DAT respondents, with public safety system contributions exceeding contri-
butions for the other groups of employees (this reflects the earlier retire-
ment ages among uniformed officers). On average, employer contributions
to state systems are the lowest.
Public employee retirement systems are typically contributory, that is,
they require contributions by their members. Often these contributions are
"picked-up" under section 414(h)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, effec-
tively making them pretax contributions by the employees. In this instance,
they are different from private-sector defined benefit plans, under which
employee contributions are made after taxes. This may be one of the rea-
sons why private sector defined benefit plans are typically noncontributory.
In the PENDAT survey, employee contributions range from 4 to 6 percent
of the employees pay, and average 5.09 percent. Employee contributions
are generally higher for plans covering teachers and police and firefighters
(6.08 percent and 7.02 percent, respectively). Employee contributions in
plans covering state employees averaged the lowest at 4.39 percent.
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Public Pension Plan Investments and Performance
Asset allocation policy plays a key role in determining investment returns in
a pension system. Before the early 1980s, state and local retirement systems
held most of their assets in fixed-income securities, earning relatively low
rates of return. This was often because their asset allocation choices were re-
stricted by "legal lists," which specified the general types of investments that
could be made and the maximum percent ofassets that could be held in cer-
tain types of securities. For example, many legal lists limited the maximum
percent of assets held in common stock to 30 percent or less.
During the 1980s, many legal lists were replaced by "prudent person"
rules allowing investments in a wide mix ofsecurities, as long as standards of
prudence and diversification were met. Although long established in com-
mon law, the prudent person concept was codified with the passage of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Earlier concern about
risk, a reason often given for the legal list restrictions, yielded to a desire to
participate in the higher rates ofreturn from equities and other investments.
Public pensionplan asset allocation. During the 1990s, equities came to playa
much more important role in the portfolios of state and local retirement sys-
tems. Table 7 shows that over 40 percent of public plan portfolios is now in-
vested in domestic equities, with systems covering teachers investing slightly
more (45 percent) and systems covering public safety employees investing
slightly less (42 percent; Zorn 1999). The major difference in asset alloca-
tion across the plans covering the different employee groups pertains to in-
vestments in real estate and international securities. While systems covering
state employees and teachers invested 16 percent and 14 percent of their
portfolios, respectively, in these two major classes of investments, systems
covering public safety and general local employees invested, respectively,
only 7 percent and 9 percent. System size may playa role in explaining this
difference. Systems covering state employees and teachers tend to be large
systems, with sufficient assets to diversify their portfolios and sufficient re-
sources to monitor complex investments.
Our comparison of investment patterns across public and private pension
plans indicates that these differences have narrowed over time, comparing
the public and private pension arena (Table 8). Among the top 1,000 pen-
sion systems, around half of the total assets (or more) are held in equities
today, over one-third in bonds, and the rest in real estate, cash, and other
forms of investments (Anand 1999). Overall, public pensions still do tend to
hold somewhat less equity (59 percent) than do private funds (64 percent),
and slightly more bonds (35 percent versus 29 percent). The international
equity exposure of public funds (11 percent) is also lower than that of pri-
vate funds (14 percent). Other holdings (real estate, cash) prove relatively
similar.
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TABLE 7. State and Local Government Pension Investments, 1996
Teacher
State and school Police and Local
employee employee firefighter employee All
systems systems systems systems systems
Percentage of total investments
Short term 3.1 3.1 7.3 4.6 4.4
Domestic stocks 41.7 44.5 42.0 43.0 42.7
Domestic bonds 35.9 34.1 41.8 40.9 38.8
Real estate mortgages 0.4 1.6 0.2 0.7 0.7
Real estate equities 2.4 2.1 1.3 1.5 1.8
International equities 10.0 8.1 4.8 5.3 6.9
International fixed-income 2.9 1.9 0.7 1.3 1.7
Other 3.6 4.6 1.9 2.7 3.0
Total investments ($B) 545.8 358.0 74.9 113.5 1,092.2
Investment returns
Rate of return 1996 13.9 13.5 13.4 13.7 1376
Exp. I-year return given
allocation * 11.7 12.3 11.5 11.7 11.8
5 annualized rate of return
(1991-96) 11.5 11.0 10.6 11.5 11.3
Source: Authors' tabulations from PPCC, PENDAT Database, 1997. See Zorn (1997).
*Calculated using benchmark investment returns for the various asset classes.
Despite these similarities, it remains the fact that some state and local
pension system investments are constrained within certain investment cate-
gories, facing prohibitions against purchasing certain types of investments
and enjoinders to invest in some specific holdings (Mitchell and McCarthy
1999). For instance, 19 percent of the funds in the PENDAT sample face con-
stitutional restrictions on investments; and 12 percent are or have been pro-
hibited from making certain investments (usually in South Africa, Northern
Ireland, or countries that did not follow MacBride principles). Other times
there are mandates favoring certain investments: for example, 4 percent of
the plans must direct a certain percentage of their plan investments to in-
state holdings. In addition, many other funds have internal policy limita-
tions on asset allocations, or other statutory limits on asset allocations (see
Table 9). The extent to which such asset restrictions influence investment
policy and investment returns as well as investment risk is an extremely im-
portant and complex issue (Mitchell and Hsin 1997a, 1997b; Munnell and
Sunden this volume; Useem and Hess this volume).
Investment income and return. Tables 7 and 8 indicate rates of return earned
by state and local pension investments, as reflected by the PPCC survey re-
spondents. On average, the investments earned a 13.66 percent return in
1996, higher than the 11.77 percent expected return calculated using the
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TABLE 8. Pension Plan Assets and Investment Performance, various years
I. Public vs. private Public Private
plan assets (%) systems' plans l
Equities 58.6 63.7
U.S. 46.7 46.7
Foreign 11.2 14.2
Other 0.7 2.8
Bonds 34.8 28.9
U.S. 31.9 27.1
Foreign 2.1 1.7
Other 0.8 0.1
Real Estate 3.3 3.3
Cash 2.1 2.1
Other 6.6 2.0
Year
II. Trends in public plan
asset mix2 (%) 1950 1960 1970 1980 1989 1992 1996
Corporate equities 0 3 17 22 40 42 50
Corporate bonds 12 36 58 48 27 21 21
U.S. government securities 51 30 11 20 27 28 16
Other 37 31 14 10 6 9 13
III. Public plan investment Number
performance Year Funds3 Index' oJplans
Return on assets (%) 1996 13.7 21.3 200
1995 19.6 35.0 200
1994 1.5 -0.1 213
1993 11.8 10.7 213
1992 9.3 8.2 213
Source: Adapted from Mitchell and McCarthy (1999).
I Anand (1999).
2Authors' calculations based on Mitchell and Carr (1992) and Zorn (1997).
3 Authors' calculations based on Zorn (1997).
'CRSP Value-weighted NYSE/NASDAQ stock index including all distributions.
systems' asset allocations and benchmark returns earned On the major secu-
rity classes. However, another study (Nofsinger 1998) compared public pen-
sion plan returns to a composite market index and concluded that public
plans tend to underperform the market. Further study of this issue would
be fruitful, but in any event the fact that public pension investment income
contributes substantially to plan funding is not in dispute.13
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TABLE 9. Investment Restrictions among Public Pension Systems, 1996
Percent Percent
having having
($-wtd.) N (plan-wtd.) N
Statutory asset limits by type!
Cap on bonds 15 260 4 261
Cap on bonds as percentage of issuer 6 260 7 261
Cap on real estate 29 260 18 261
Cap on foreign invst. 29 260 16 261
Cap on stock 39 260 25 261
Asset caps for those with statutory limits 2
Bonds: max % of portfolio 46 11 40 11
Max bond as % of Issuer 6 17 6 17
Real estate: max % of portfolio 13 46 9 46
Foreign invst.: max % of portfolio 11 43 10 43
Stock: max % of portfolio 54 65 59 65
Source: Adapted from Mitchell and McCarthy (1999).
! Statutory limits given in state constitution or state regulation.
2Some plans subject to statutory investment limits do not report actual fractional limits.
One of the driving forces behind state and local governments' success in
funding retirement benefits has been the high returns earned in financial
markets, especially domestic equities. State and local plans have been able
to capture these returns largely as a result of the changes made to their asset
allocations over the past two decades. Table 8 indicates the dramatic time
series change in public plans' asset mix: as recently as 1989, they held the
majority of their portfolios in corporate and government bonds, and prior
to 1960 they held virtually no equities at all.
Returns on U.S. equities are often thought to be more volatile than re-
turns on bonds, so the fact that public plans hold a higher proportion of
bonds would be seen as reducing the volatility of public sector pension fund
investment returns. But because equities have historically performed better
than bonds, holding more bonds produces lower returns for public plans.
This is seen clearly in the last panel of Table 8, which reports public pen-
sion fund returns over the period 1993-96 (for the PENDAT sample), as
compared with a value-weighted market index over the same time period.14
The evidence in Table 8 shows that public plan returns are less volatile
than market returns, outperforming the stock market in poor years and
underperforming it in good years. It should be noted that these two return
patterns are not strictly comparable, inasmuch as the underlying risks in
the two portfolios are different. That is, a market basket of stocks would be
anticipated to perform significantly better than public portfolios in good
equity years and worse in poor equity years, because public plans hold a sub-
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TABLE 10. Public Pension Plan Reported Expenses and Turnover, 1997
Administrative expenses 1
Investment expenses 2
Stock turnover 3
$-weighted
$78
0.27%
38%
System-
weighted
$211
0.44%
Number
afplans
221
155 4
67
Source: Adapted from Mitchell and McCarthy (1999).
1Calculated per member (including active, retired, and disabled members).
2 Calculated as % of fair market value of system assets at 31 December 1996.
3Turnover defined as the smaller of annual stock purchases and sales divided by the average
portfolio value over 1996. Authors' calculations based on PENDAT Database (Zom 1997).
4 Statistically significant differences were found between funds reporting investment expenses
and those not reporting; those not reporting were smaller (p < 0.05) and earned lower returns
(p < 0.005).
stantial fraction of assets in bonds. Unfortunately, the database we use does
not report investment returns for specific assets held by public plans. To the
extent that private pensions also hold more equity than do public funds,
one could also anticipate that private pensions will experience higher re-
turns and higher volatility. It is not entirely clear why corporate stockholders
should be less risk-averse than state taxpayers, and indeed with the growth
of stockholding in the U.S. economy, it is likely that these two groups will
overlap more considerably in the future.
The final investment-related question we consider focuses on public plan
expenses and turnover in plan portfolios. This is important because higher
returns can be eroded over time by high expenses, and all public plan stake-
holders would likely benefit from paying close attention to the administra-
tive costs of managing the plans. Unfortunately it is difficult to obtain data
on expenses for the entire range of public plans; there was substantial non-
response among respondents surveyed by Zorn (1997) on this question, sug-
gesting that those who did reply may be nonrepresentative in some way. Our
analysis of the 221 systems offering information on administrative expenses
shows that these reported costs averaged $211 per member per year on a per
member basis but one-third of that level in the dollar-weighted computa-
tion; hence larger plans incur substantially lower expenses (Table 10). Turn-
ing to reported investment expenses, these are computed as a fraction of
system assets (year-end), and here too, it must be noted that only 155 of the
full set of 379 plans responded to this question in the survey. For those re-
porting, average investment expenses totaled 44 basis points in 1996, which
falls to only 27 basis points ifdollar-weighted. Again, the larger funds prove
to have lower expense ratios than smaller funds. Both results are compatible
with previous studies showing scale economies in pension fund administra-
tion (Mitchell 1998) , and these investment charge figures are consistent with
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the lower end of institutional money management fees charged by pension
investment managers. Finally, Table 10 indicates how much turnover the
public plans' stock portfolio experienced on an annual basis, for the sixty-
seven funds that answered this question in the survey. Turnover is defined as
the lesser of annual purchases or sales divided by the average amount in the
portfolio over the year. This is an important number because some have ar-
gued that high turnover in pension fund stock portfolios result in high bro-
kerage and investment commissions. These turnover figures (38 percent) are
lower than reported by public funds in earlier years (McCarthy and Turner
1992) but the substantial nonreporting must lead one to question whether
these results are generalizable.
Public Pension Governance and Structure
Over time policymakers have become increasingly interested in how pub-
lic pension plans are governed, mainly because they are responsible for so
many participants and such a large pool of investment funds. Generally,
state and local retirement systems are overseen by a retirement board that
has authority for making decisions related to investments, actuarial valua-
tions, system operations, and in some instances the benefits provided by the
plan. Day-to-day administration is usually conducted either by the retire-
ment system's staff or by staff of the government sponsoring the system.
Governance and administration. A perusal of Tables 11 and 12 reveals that
state and local pension plans in the United States are managed by a pen-
sion board oftrustees, a group that typically bears responsibility for invest-
ment policy and often for asset allocation. The number of board members
ranges from one to two dozen, but the typical board is usually formed by
eight people, with most of the board members appointed by politicians or
serving ex officio.I5 The average number of board members is higher for sys-
tems serving state employees and teachers (9.2 and 10, respectively) than for
systems serving public safety and general local employees (7.5 and 7.6, re-
spectively). It is interesting to note that board composition also varies with
the type of covered employees. As shown in Table 12, systems serving teach-
ers and public safety employees have a somewhat higher percent of elected
members and lower percent of appointed members than do systems serving
state or local general employees.
Typically, day-to-day system administration is done by staff under the
supervision of the system's executive director or plan administrator. Many
systems hire an executive who reports directly to the board. Some smaller
systems established by a single governmental employer are administered by
employees in the employer's finance or human resources department. Gen-
erally, staff sizes vary with the number of covered members and the services
provided. Data provided by the PPCC survey shows staff sizes ranging from a
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TABLE 11. Public Pension Plan Governance and Structure, 1996
Number
Mean Median ofPlans
I. Board size and composition
Number of board members 8.3 8 244
% appointed and ex officio 62 60 231
% elected by members 35 40 224
II. Board responsibilities (% responsible for)
Investment 88 244
Benefits 71 244
Assumptions 89 244
Asset allocation 84 228
III. Constraints on board behavior (% subject to)
Prudent Man limitation 88 236
Ethics Standards written 66 233
State legal list 29 238
Constitutional restrictions on investment 19 225
Own investment prohibitions 12 235
In-state investment requirements 4 233
State insurance law 3 235
Iv. Public pension board oversight (% requiring)
Actuarial valuation annually 100 364
Annual audit 99 252
Independent investment performance audits 86 231
Source: Adapted fmm Mitchell and McCarthy (1999).
single individual working part time to administer a small local plan, to over
200 people for plans covering several hundred thousand members. While
staff size averaged 53.6 for all respondents, systems covering state employ-
ees and teachers had much larger staffs on average (120.5 and 111.4 respec-
tively) than systems covering public safety and general local employees (7.0
and 11.0 respectively). This is mainly due to the fact that systems serving
state employees and teachers tend to have many more members than sys-
tems covering public safety and local employees.
When staff size is examined in relation to the number of active members
served by the plan, the results suggest economies of scale in system admin-
istration. Table 12 shows that the typical public pension system has around
2.6 staffmembers per 1,000 active members, with systems covering state em-
ployees and teachers averaging 1.5 each, compared with systems covering
public safety and local government employees (5.0 and 2.8, respectively).
Since state and teacher systems have substantially more members than sys-
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TABLE 12. Public Pension Plan Governance and Structure by Plan Type, 1996
Teacher
Stale and scfwol Police and Local
employee employee firefighter employee All
systems systems systems systems systems
Average board size (N) 9.24 10.03 7.50 7.55 8.31
Appointed (%) 47 40 39 50 46
Elected (%) 31 43 45 32 35
Ex officio (%) 18 16 13 15 16
Other (%) 4 1 3 3 3
Staff size (N) 120.5 111.4 7.0 11.0 53.6
Staff per 1,000 active members 1.5 1.5 5.0 2.8 2.6
Source: Authors' tabulations from PPCC, PENDAT Database, 1997. See Zorn (1997).
tems covering public safety and local employees, it is likely that their lower
staffing ratios reflect economies of scale.
The vast majority ofretirement boards have the responsibility for oversee-
ing pension investments. As such, board members are acting as fiduciaries
and required to use their bestjudgment to ensure that future funds are avail-
able to pay plan benefits. In the private sector, corporate pension fiduciaries
are regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ofI974; this
law requires private pension funds to be invested using the "care, skill, and
diligence" of a prudent individual acting "solely in the interest" of plan par-
ticipants. While state and local pension plans are exempt from the fiduciary
language of ERISA, it is interesting to that the same or very similar language
has been adopted in most public plans (88 percent). Somewhat less preva-
lent are written ethical standards for public board members, with only two-
thirds ofall public plans requiring these. This approach seeks to limit poten-
tial conflicts of interest with regard to public pension boards, and has been
championed by the California Public Employee Retirement System (CaIP-
ERS) in recent years. In addition virtually all reporting plans have annual
actuarial valuations and are subject to annual actuarial audits, and some 86
percent are subject to independent investment audits. These reporting and
disclosure requirements contribute to a more transparent public pension
environment for all concerned stakeholders.
Conclusion
We conclude that state and local government pension plans have been gen-
erally successful in providing adequate and secure retirement benefits in
ways that substantially reduce their long-term costs. Most benefits are pro-
vided through defined benefit plans, paid over the life of the retiree, that
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do not vary with fluctuations in the financial markets. In many instances,
the benefits are also indexed to inflation. In addition, most of the plans are
well funded, with investment income accounting for over two-thirds of plan
receipts, thereby reducing required contributions. We have also shown that
public plan assets are relatively diversified, especially as compared to the
past. And compared to the private sector, public plans tend to have rela-
tively smoother investment performance patterns, mainly attributable to
their larger share in bonds and smaller equity holdings.
These signs of pension system maturity are strongly positive predictors
for the future. Nevertheless, state and local plans will face challenges over
the next several decades. The baby boom aging process suggests that public
employers will face a burst ofretirements within the next ten to fifteen years.
Another potential pressure results from fiscal stress, which can undermine
efforts to fully fund accumulating promises (Mitchell and Smith 1994). As
long as economic conditions remain favorable, there appears to be little to
worry about, but an economic downturn can reduce funding in a variety of
ways. Additionally, if capital market returns are highly correlated with state
and local tax revenues, funding problems could be exacerbated in an eco-
nomic downturn. More research is required on this potential linkage.
Another development pertains to public employee and employer interest
in defined contribution plans. Some states have adopted defined contribu-
tion plans, induding the State Employees Retirement System of Nebraska,
the Teachers' Defined Contribution Plan of West Virginia, and Michigan's
State Employee plan for workers newly hired in 1997 and thereafter (Fore
this volume). Whether others will follow depends in large part on cost and
political considerations, induding how state and local budgets are faring,
and whether employee unions see them with favor.
These factors suggest some pressures for change. For example, to pro-
tect public plans from political pressures resulting from fiscal stress, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has recently
proposed that all states adopt a uniform set of laws related to public pension
plan investments. This Management of Public Employee Retirement Sys-
tems Act (MPERSA) is intended to modernize investment decisionmaking
in public pensions (Wisniewski 1999). Whether it will eventually be adopted
by state legislatures remains to be seen.
In addition, demographic and economic pressures are also affecting plan
design. In order to keep experienced, long-term employees on staff, some
public employers have modified their retirement plans in ways that encour-
age employees to remain in service beyond their normal retirement date.
These deferred retirement option plans (DROPs) reward employees who
postpone their retirement by providing a partial lump-sum distribution
when they finally leave employment (Eitelberg this volume). Additionally,
concern over pension portability arising from the debate over defined con-
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tribution plans has lead some public retirement systems to adopt "hybrid
plans" combining features from both defined benefit and defined contribu-
tion plans. Undoubtedly, plan design will continue to evolve over the next
several decades, as state and local pension systems in the United States con-
tinue to evolve with the changing environment.
Notes
1. Active and retired participant data refer to 1997 and are taken from Zorn (1999);
asset information for 1998 is from Anand (1999).
2. Some public sector plans are of the defined contribution variety as we note
below.
3. For a discussion of pension plan types, see McGill et al. (1996)
4. For early discussion ofpublic pension plans see Bleakney (1972), Inman (1982),
and Phillips (1992); more recent analyses include Mitchell and Carr (1996), Hsin and
Mitchell (1994, 1996, 1997), and Mitchell and Smith (1994).
5. This section draws on Zorn (1999).
6. Total investment earnings amounted to more then $780B over the entire 1987-
97 period (not shown in Table 1).
7. For an analysis of teacher retirement systems see Wisniewski (1999).
8. These statistics are compiled from the Public Pension Coordinating Council's
1997 PENDAT Database (Zorn 1997). This survey covered plans employing more
than 80 percent of active state and local system members.
9. The precise split between the employer and employee contribution amount is
less consequential for eventual benefit amounts than is the overall cost of the plan.
But here, too, it is difficult to compare public and private plan costs, since the rising
value of private sector pensions due to good stock market performance has per-
mitted many private employers to take "contribution holidays" from their pensions,
for more than a decade. For further detail on employer costs for employee compen-
sation see BLS (1999).
10. Perhaps as a result, only 4 percent of public plans have benefits "formally"
integrated with social security payments; more than half of private plans do (many
others have informal integration arrangements).
11. Prior to June 15, 1996, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board re-
quired public plans to disclose the pension benefit obligation (PBO), a measure of
the actuarial accrued liability based on the projected unit credit actuarial method, in
the notes to their financial statements. This was reported in addition to the actuarial
accrued liability determined under the actuarial method actually used to calculate
the plan's liabilities and required contributions. The purpose of disclosing the PBO
was to provide a more consistent measure with which to compare funding progress
across public plans. In 1996, GASB (1996) eliminated the PBO disclosure require-
ment after substantial debate, on the grounds that it did not substantially clarify
funded status and was possibly responsible for a reduction in employer contributions
for some plans. Currently, GASB provides for the use of anyone of the following
actuarial cost methods: entry age, frozen entry age, attained age, frozen attained age,
projected unit credit, and aggregate actuarial cost. With the spread ofGASB report-
ing among retirement systems, the PBO statistic has been deemphasized or dropped
entirely from public employee pension system annual financial reports.
12. This is derived from the 1995 and 1997 PENDAT surveys (Zorn 1997).
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13. See Munnell and Sunden (this volume) and Useem and Hess (this volume) for
further discussion on this point.
14. In examining this table, readers should note that the comparison is between
a group of funds (with a diversified asset mix, including stocks and bonds) and a
stock index (including only stocks). Thus, the fact that the funds underperformed
the index in 1995 and 1996 is not an indication of investment mismanagement but
rather the result of holding a diversified portfolio.
15. Some systems, such as the Florida Retirement System and the Iowa Public Em-
ployee Retirement System operates without a board of trustees, relying instead on
authority vested in a senior official of the sponsoring agency (Wisniewski 1999).
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